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evidence suggesting that action and tone binding are, at least 
in part, driven by distinct mechanisms.
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Introduction
The perception of the sensory consequences of one’s own 
actions is inherently different to the perception of other sen-
sory events. For example, people tend to perceive the sen-
sory consequences of their actions as attenuated (Blakemore 
et al. 1998; Shergill et al. 2003), which is proposed to facili-
tate the distinction between self- and externally generated 
actions (Blakemore et al. 2000). Another well-described 
perceptual distortion with voluntary actions is the temporal 
attraction between a self-generated action and its sensory 
outcome: A ‘willed’ action is perceived to occur later in 
time, whereas its sensory consequence (e.g., a tone) is per-
ceived to occur earlier in time. This attraction is absent for 
involuntary actions, suggesting it is the intentionality that 
leads to the temporal binding of the action and its effect. The 
term ‘intentional binding’ is commonly used to describe this 
phenomenon (Haggard et al. 2002).
As intentional binding occurs only in the context of voli-
tional actions (Haggard et al. 2002), it has been suggested to 
be a quantitative index of awareness of action or agency, that 
is, the sense that one controls one’s own actions. As an objec-
tive and replicable behavioral measure, it has considerable 
advantages over verbal self-reports in the study of volition. 
The intentional binding paradigm has therefore been applied 
to study agency in healthy individuals (e.g., Moore et al. 
2011) and in clinical populations, such as individuals with 
Parkinson’s disease (Moore et al. 2010b) or schizophrenia 
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(Haggard et al. 2003). In many of these studies, the magni-
tudes of ‘action binding’ (the temporal attraction of action 
toward its outcome tone) and ‘tone binding’ (the attraction 
of consequent tone toward action) are summed up to obtain 
an ‘overall binding’ measure. This measure is then inter-
preted as a positive correlate of agency. For example, the 
drug ketamine, which can induce a reversible psychosis in 
healthy individuals, enhances overall binding, similarly to 
that observed in schizophrenia, and has been suggested to 
increase agency (Moore et al. 2011).
Despite the growing use of binding as a measure of 
agency, the underlying mechanisms of action and tone bind-
ing remain largely unclear. Moore and Haggard (2008) have 
shown that action binding depends on both a predictive pro-
cess (modulated by the probability of the tone following 
the action) and an inferential process (as action binding is 
apparent even in low effect probability as long as the tone 
occurs). Both of these processes are significantly supported 
by the contingency or causality relation between the action 
and tone (Moore et al. 2009), suggesting a critical role for 
learning an action–effect association. Tone binding on the 
other hand is related to a more general association process, 
as it does not depend on establishing a specific action–effect 
mapping (Desantis et al. 2012). A predictive process has 
also been suggested to account for tone binding, in which 
predicted sensory outcomes reach perceptual threshold 
more rapidly (Waszak et al. 2012).
Alongside these different accounts for action and tone 
binding, recent studies have shown specific modulations of 
either measure. For example, repetitive transcranial mag-
netic stimulation over the pre-supplementary motor area 
can specifically alter tone binding with no effect on action 
binding (Moore et al. 2010a). These studies suggest that 
action and tone binding may be driven by distinct mecha-
nisms. Despite this body of evidence, there are few stud-
ies which examine the mechanisms of both action and tone 
binding. The present study aims to satisfy this experimental 
challenge by considering the role of cue integration in both 
action and tone binding.
In many sensorimotor tasks, perceptual phenomena 
have been successfully explained by cue integration mod-
els. These experimentally tractable models have also been 
suggested to contribute to the sense of agency, and the 
intentional binding in particular (Moore and Fletcher 2012; 
Moore and Haggard 2008). According to this framework, 
the sensorimotor system optimally combines information 
from different sources, such as multiple sensory modalities 
(Ernst and Banks 2002; Hillis et al. 2002) and prior expecta-
tions (Körding and Wolpert 2004), in order to reduce vari-
ability in performance (e.g., Ernst and Banks 2002). In bind-
ing, the action event and the sensory outcome event (tone) 
provide two separate cues for estimating their time. The 
time estimates are then a weighted average of the action and 
tone events, where the weight of each cue corresponds to 
its reliability (or in other words the precision of estimates, 
expressed as the inverse of the variance) relative to the reli-
ability of the other cue. If both action and tone binding are 
supported by action–effect cue integration, this framework 
could explain the temporal attraction between action and 
tone events in binding.
In this study, we investigated the contribution of cue 
integration to action and tone binding. To this end, we 
manipulated the reliability of the tone event by modulating 
its intensity relative to a background white noise. Based on 
each subject’s individual auditory detection threshold, we 
generated three tones with increasing intensities, which in 
the presence of noise provided high, intermediate and low 
levels of uncertainty in the perception of tone onset.
We tested three main predictions of the cue integration 
hypothesis under different conditions of tone reliability. 
First, if cue integration underlies both action and tone bind-
ing measures, action binding will be weakest under high tone 
uncertainty, whereas tone binding will be strongest. These 
changes should be mainly driven by differential weighting 
of the action and tone cues according to uncertainty, in the 
conditions where both cues are provided. Second, if such cue 
integration mechanism is in fact common to both action and 
tone binding, the extent of changes in these measures as a 
result of modifying uncertainty will be related. Finally, in 
conditions where both action and tone cues are provided, the 
variability of time estimates should be lower (i.e., time esti-
mates should be more precise) than in conditions where only 
one cue is provided, reflecting the key behavioral advantage 
of cue integration for perceptual precision.
Methods
Participants
Twenty right-handed volunteers (ten females) aged 18–36 
(mean: 26, SD: 6) took part in the study and were compen-
sated £14.5 for their participation. All subjects reported no 
history of neuropsychiatric disorders and had normal or cor-
rected-to-normal vision. They all gave written informed con-
sent before starting the experiment. The study was approved 
by the Cambridge Local Research Ethics Committee.
Experimental procedure
Subjects were tested with a modified version of the inten-
tional binding task (Haggard et al. 2002) using button press 
actions and auditory tone outcomes. Auditory stimuli were 
presented by Sennheiser HD250 Linear II headphones 
throughout the testing session. An auditory detection task 
was first performed to identify each subject’s detection 
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threshold. White noise (1,000 Hz frequency) was played 
continuously, while pure tones (1,000 Hz; 100-ms duration) 
were played at intervals of 1–6 s. Tones were generated 
by multiplying the amplitude of a sinusoidal waveform by 
factors between 0.01 and 0.1 (fixed 0.01 interval between 
them). Overall level of noise was 80-dB SPL, and tones 
were between 63 and 83-dB SPL (intervals of 1–3-dB SPL 
between each tone). Subjects’ task was to press a key to 
indicate when they were able to hear a tone. For each tone 
intensity (10 in total), six trials were played pseudoran-
domly, making up a total of 60 trials. Stimuli were gener-
ated and presented using Matlab (Mathworks, CA) version 
2009a.
On the main intentional binding task, subjects attended to 
a ‘clock’ on a computer screen marked with numbers from 
five to sixty in intervals of five (Fig. 1). A single hand rotated 
clockwise (period of 2,560 ms), providing a time stamp for 
reporting the perceived time of events. On each trial, the 
clock hand started at a random position. Subjects used a 
keyboard to report the time of self-paced button presses or 
tones (1,000 Hz; 100 ms). In the ‘baseline tone’ condition, 
a tone was played at random without a prior action between 
2.5 and 6 s after trial onset. In the ‘baseline action’ condi-
tion, subjects made a button press, which was not followed 
by a tone. In the two operant conditions, a tone followed the 
button press by 250 ms, and subjects were asked to report 
either the time of their button press or the tone. These four 
conditions were blocked. On each trial, the clock stopped 
1,500–2,500 ms after the event that was judged. Subjects 
were discouraged from pre-planning the time at which they 
press the button.
In contrast to previous intentional binding studies, a 
background white noise was played throughout the trials 
in order to increase the uncertainty about the time of tone 
onset. The tones had one of three amplitudes, generated 
as a function of each subject’s detection threshold (see 
“Analyses”). These three amplitudes were used to produce 
three levels of uncertainty with regard to estimating the time 
of tone onset. The three levels of uncertainty were pseudor-
andomly interleaved in the three task conditions in which 
tones were played. The task started with practice blocks. In 
the experimental blocks, each of the four block types con-
sisted of 30 trials and was repeated four times. In total, 120 
trials were performed for each condition, 40 trials per level 
of uncertainty. The four conditions’ blocks were presented 
in a counterbalanced order across subjects. The testing ses-
sion was approximately 2 h long. All stimuli were displayed 
with Matlab Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard 1997).
Analyses
The preliminary tone detection performance was fitted with 
a psychometric (Weibull) function, using a maximum-like-
lihood procedure (Wichmann and Hill 2001). Each subject’s 
amplitude of detection threshold was calculated at 50 % 
threshold in the psychometric function. In addition to the 
threshold amplitude, two more amplitudes were calculated, 
by multiplying that of the detection threshold by 2 and 5. 
This generated low (detection threshold), intermediate 
and high intensities for the tones used in the binding task. 
Across subjects, low tones had a mean intensity of 78-dB 
SPL; intermediate tones, 84-dB SPL; and high, 92-dB SPL; 
Clock position estimate


















Fig. 1  Illustration of the modi-
fied intentional binding task. 
Subjects attended to a ‘clock’ 
while hearing a background 
white noise. In the operant 
conditions, they were asked to 
press a button at their own pace, 
which triggered a tone (250-ms 
delay). The tone had low, inter-
mediate or high intensity (inter-
leaved in a pseudorandomized 
order). Subjects reported either 
the time of the button press or 
the time of the tone (conditions 
blocked) using the position of 
the rotating clock hand. Binding 
is measured as the difference 
between the means of estima-
tion errors for ‘action’ or ‘tone’ 
events, and those in the cor-
responding baseline conditions, 
when the action and tone occur 
separately
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the noise was fixed at overall level of 80-dB SPL. Low, 
intermediate and high tone intensities were used to provide 
high, intermediate and low levels of uncertainty about the 
tone onset, respectively.
Mean estimation errors (i.e., the difference between 
actual and estimated time of event) were calculated sepa-
rately for each level of uncertainty for action and tone in the 
baseline and operant conditions. Trials with outlier estima-
tion errors (±2.5 SD from mean) were removed from each 
subject’s dataset (on average approximately three trials per 
subject). One subject was excluded from the study, as the 
standard deviation (SD) of his baseline action values was 
greater than two times the group mean SD. For each level 
of uncertainty, the mean estimation errors in baseline action 
and tone conditions were subtracted from their correspond-
ing operant conditions to obtain action and tone binding 
measures, respectively.
To explore the effect of uncertainty on binding, we per-
formed repeated-measures ANOVAs with uncertainty (high, 
intermediate and low) as a within-subject factor on the fol-
lowing datasets: (1) SDs of estimation errors in baseline 
tone condition; (2) action and tone binding values; and (3) 
mean estimation errors in baseline and operant tone condi-
tions. Greenhouse–Geisser correction for non-sphericity was 
applied where appropriate. ANOVAs were followed by two-
tailed paired t tests, except for the comparisons of binding 
across uncertainties, in which the direction was hypothesized 
according to the cue integration prediction. Two additional 
analyses were performed: (1) correlating the ratios between 
action binding in low and high uncertainty and the corre-
sponding ratios in tone binding, using Spearman’s ranked 
correlation, and (2) pairwise comparisons of SDs in base-
line versus operant action and tone conditions for each level 
of uncertainty. All pairwise comparisons were corrected for 
multiple comparisons using Bonferroni correction.
Results
Table 1 summarizes the estimation errors and their SDs for 
all experimental conditions across subjects. We first sought 
to verify the assumption that reducing tone intensities 
against the background noise would increase uncertainty 
with regard to estimates of tone event onset. We examined 
the SDs of estimation errors of tone onset in the ‘baseline 
tone’ condition, that is, where tones were played at random, 
and not associated with a button press or ‘action’ (Fig. 2). 
Repeated-measures ANOVA showed a main effect of inten-
sity (F(1.29, 24.43) = 23.8, p < 0.001) on estimation error SD. 
Post hoc two-tailed (Bonferroni corrected) comparisons 
confirmed an increase in the SD of estimation errors for low-
intensity tones, relative to both intermediate (t19 = 4.38, 
p < 0.001) and high (t19 = 5.94, p < 0.001) intensities, and a 
weak trend toward increased SD in intermediate- compared 
to high-intensity tones (t19 = 1.69, p = 0.11). This confirms 
an increasing variability in time estimates with reducing 
tone intensity. High-, intermediate- and low-intensity tones 
were thus able to provide low, intermediate and high levels 
of temporal uncertainty, respectively.
The cue integration hypothesis predicts that as uncer-



























Fig. 2  The standard deviation (SD) of estimation errors for the dif-
ferent tone intensities in baseline tone condition, wherein a tone was 
played at random without a prior action. SDs were increased in trials 
with low tone intensity relative to both intermediate and high intensi-
ties (***p < 0.001). High, intermediate and low tone intensities thus 
provided low, intermediate and high levels of sensory uncertainty in 
estimating the time of tone onset. Error bars indicate mean standard 
errors for the study group
Table 1  Mean estimation errors and mean standard deviation (SD) 
of estimation errors across subjects (mean standard error in parenthe-
ses). Values are shown for the estimated time of action and tone in the 
baseline and operant conditions for the three levels of uncertainty
Level of  
uncertainty
Condition Event Mean (SE)  
estimation  
error (ms)
Mean (SE) SD 
of estimation  
error (ms)
Low Baseline Action −8 (11) 75 (6)
Tone 35 (11) 61 (3)
Operant Action 31 (11) 79 (5)
Tone −16 (22) 76 (4)
Intermediate Baseline Action −8 (11) 75 (6)
Tone 46 (11) 66 (3)
Operant Action 23 (10) 70 (5)
Tone −19 (21) 80 (5)
High Baseline Action −8 (11) 75 (6)
Tone 95 (11) 90 (5)
Operant Action 24 (10) 71 (6)
Tone −10 (23) 77 (4)
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is reduced), action binding will be reduced, whereas tone 
binding will be enhanced. To test this, we first calculated 
action and tone binding separately for each level of uncer-
tainty, by subtracting estimation errors in the baseline con-
ditions from their corresponding ‘operant’ conditions, in 
which the action was associated with a tone (Fig. 3). To 
examine the effect of cue integration on action and tone 
binding independently, we entered these measures to two 
separate repeated-measures ANOVAs, with uncertainty 
(low, intermediate and high) as a within-subject factor.
A main effect of uncertainty on action binding was found 
(F(1.34, 25.37) = 4.22, p = 0.04). One-tailed (Bonferroni cor-
rected) post hoc t tests indicated a reduction in action bind-
ing in the high relative to low uncertainty (t19 = −4.465, 
p < 0.001), and a just significantly reduced action binding in 
the intermediate relative to low uncertainty (t19 = −2.261, 
p = 0.05). A main effect of uncertainty was also found for 
tone binding measures (F(1.64, 31.2) = 28.69, p < 0.001). Post 
hoc pairwise comparisons confirmed an increase in tone 
binding (i.e., an earlier estimate of the tone event) in the 
high uncertainty condition, relative to both intermediate 
(t19 = −5.546, p < 0.001) and low (t19 = −6.109, p < 0.001) 
levels of uncertainty. In addition, higher tone binding was 
observed in the intermediate compared to low uncertainty 
(t19 = −2.4, p = 0.04).
Differences in action binding could only result from 
changes in estimation errors in the operant condition, as 
there were no different levels of uncertainty in baseline 
action condition. By contrast, the differences in tone bind-
ing could arise from changes in either baseline or operant 
conditions, as estimation errors were calculated separately 
for each level of tone uncertainty in both of these conditions. 
To explore where differences in tone binding originated 
from, we examined the estimation errors in the baseline 
and operant tone conditions in two separate ANOVAs. 
A main effect of uncertainty on baseline tone estimation 
errors was found (F(1.56, 29.7) = 69.81, p < 0.001), with signif-
icant post hoc (Bonferroni corrected) pairwise comparisons 
between the three levels of uncertainty (high–intermediate: 
t19 = 8.97, p < 0.001; high–low: t19 = 9.23, p < 0.001; inter-
mediate–low: t19 = 2.88, p = 0.03). By contrast, there was 
no effect of uncertainty on operant tone estimation errors 
(F(1.7, 32.31) = 1.88, p = 0.174). Taken together, these results 
indicate that the differences observed in tone binding across 
the three levels of uncertainty were driven by changes in 
estimation errors in the baseline condition, in which only the 
tone cue was provided. On the other hand, in action binding 
these differences could only arise from changes in the oper-
ant condition, indicating a contribution of cue integration.
We next examined the relation between changes in tone 
binding and changes in action binding across uncertainties. 
If the extent of change in action binding, arising from cue 
integration, is correlated with the extent of change in tone 
binding, this would support a common effect of cue integra-
tion on tone binding as well. Specifically, we looked at action 
and tone binding measures in the low and high uncertainty 
conditions (the conditions which showed a highly significant 
difference, above). We correlated the ratio between action 
binding in the low and high uncertainty conditions and the 
corresponding ratio in tone binding. There was no signifi-
cant correlation between the change in action and tone bind-
ing as a result of uncertainty across subjects (Spearman’s 
rho = 0.038, p = 0.876), indicating there was no consistent 
relation between these changes in action and tone binding.
A critical assumption of the cue integration account is that 
the integration of multiple cues reduces variability in per-
formance. Therefore, if cue integration contributes to tone 
binding, SD in the operant condition should be lower than 
the SD in the corresponding baseline condition. However, 
two-tailed (Bonferroni corrected) comparisons revealed 
a significant increase in SD in operant relative to baseline 
tone conditions in both intermediate (t19 = 3.92, p = 0.003) 
and low (t19 = 3.77, p = 0.004) levels of uncertainty. For 
action binding, the mean SD in operant action condition 
was lower than SD in baseline action condition for low and 
intermediate uncertainties, although not statistically signifi-
cant (t19 = 1.66, p = 0.3; and t19 = 1.67, p = 0.3). Taken 
together, the results suggest that in contrast to action bind-



























Fig. 3  Action and tone binding for the three levels of tone uncer-
tainty. Dashed lines indicate the veridical time of action and tone 
events. Shapes represent the event (rectangle action, oval tone), and 
their shade denotes the condition (white baseline, gray operant). 
All events are displayed proportionally to their time of occurrence. 
Numbers indicate the mean action and tone binding across subjects 
(mean standard error in parentheses). Significance level in pairwise 
comparisons is indicated by ***p < 0.001 and *p ≤ 0.05
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Discussion
We studied the contribution of action–effect cue integration 
to the perception of action and its sensory outcome in inten-
tional binding. According to the cue integration hypothesis, 
the compression in the perceived temporal interval between 
a voluntary action and its sensory consequence results from 
using both events as temporally informative cues. The time 
estimates are based on a weighted average of the two events, 
in which the weight of each cue is determined by its relative 
reliability. As predicted by cue integration, our data show 
that reducing the reliability of the sensory outcome results 
in a smaller shift in the perceived time of action toward 
its outcome (reduced action binding). The cue integration 
hypothesis also predicted an increase in the shift of the 
perception of the sensory outcome toward the action with 
increasing uncertainty (i.e., increased tone binding). How-
ever, the results of additional analyses point to a separate 
mechanism involved in tone binding.
Action binding has been described in terms of a postdic-
tive or inferential process, as it occurs even when the action 
is not strongly predictive of a tone, as long as the tone event 
occurs (Moore and Haggard 2008). Our results suggest that 
this postdictive process could be mediated by a cue integra-
tion mechanism. On the other hand, a predictive process has 
also been proposed to support action binding, as when the 
action is highly predictive of a tone, action binding occurs 
even in trials in which tones are absent (Moore and Haggard 
2008). Consistent with this notion, even in our high uncer-
tainty condition, in which tones were at each individual sub-
ject’s perceptual threshold, action binding measures were 
significantly above zero (data not shown). The association 
between the action and its outcome has been suggested to 
explain the predictive component of action binding (Moore 
et al. 2009).
Our finding that action binding is supported by cue inte-
gration is consistent with a previous study, suggesting that 
the estimation of time of movement depends on cue integra-
tion (Lau et al. 2007). This integration combines informa-
tion about the time of action with other sources, as in the 
sensory outcome of an action. Information about the time of 
one’s own voluntary action could draw upon proprioceptive 
as well as internal volitional signals, such as an ‘efference 
copy’ of motor commands (Von Holst 1954) or components 
of the readiness potential (Lau et al. 2007). When sensory 
uncertainty is high or in the absence of sensory feedback, 
the perception of action relies more on these internal repre-
sentations, thereby reducing action binding.
The cue integration framework has been successfully 
used to explain many perceptual phenomena in the sen-
sorimotor system (e.g., Ernst and Banks 2002) and has 
been suggested to support the sense of agency (Moore and 
Fletcher 2012). Particularly, the integration of internal, 
volitional signals with external sensory cues can help deal-
ing with uncertainty in the attribution of agency. There-
fore, alongside the well-described action–effect association 
mechanism (see above), this integration could be another 
mechanism that links agency and intentional binding and 
reflects the volitional components that are captured in bind-
ing. For example, abnormal agency in disease states or under 
experimental interventions could arise from impairments in 
the internal volitional signals that normally contribute to the 
experience of agency. In turn, these impaired signals can 
lead to distinct changes in intentional binding, resulting 
from abnormal weighting of the action and outcome events. 
Future studies can thus apply the cue integration approach 
to explain abnormalities in action binding in terms of voli-
tional deficits.
If cue integration can account for action binding effects, 
can it also explain tone binding? Our data suggest not. Tone 
binding was enhanced with increasing tone uncertainty, 
which at first glance is consistent with cue integration. How-
ever, this effect is attributable to increasing perceptual shifts 
in the baseline condition (tone only) as a function of tone 
intensity, rather than changes in the operant conditions, in 
which both action and tone events occurred together. More-
over, the changes in action and tone binding that resulted 
from sensory uncertainty were not correlated, suggesting 
different underlying mechanisms. Crucially, the prediction 
that integrating cues reduces performance variability was 
not satisfied for tone binding: Variability in estimation errors 
was significantly increased when two cues were provided in 
the operant tone condition, compared to baseline tone con-
dition. These results show that the perceptual changes we 
observed in tone binding are likely to be driven by an alter-
native mechanism.
What might the alternative mechanism for tone binding 
be? Tone binding has been recently suggested to be medi-
ated by a ‘pre-activation’ mechanism (Waszak et al. 2012). 
According to this account, the neural representation of a 
predicted sensory event, such as a sensory outcome fol-
lowing a voluntary action, is activated prior to its occur-
rence. Because of this ramped predictive activity, when the 
predicted sensory outcome occurs, it reaches perceptual 
threshold faster than when it is not predicted. Consequently, 
estimation errors are smaller in the operant tone condition 
than they are in the baseline tone condition, leading to tone 
binding. Our results suggest that this pre-activation mecha-
nism can better account for the changes in tone binding under 
different levels of uncertainty. We found increased tone bind-
ing under high uncertainty, resulting from increased estima-
tion errors in baseline tone condition. As tone intensity was 
reduced against a background noise for increasing sensory 
uncertainty, more time would be required for the tones to 
reach the perceptual threshold for detection. This additional 
time would be reflected in the increased estimation errors in 
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the baseline condition. By contrast, in the operant condition, 
the learned action–effect association could diminish these 
differences in perceptual latencies. In other words, for pre-
activated tone representations, the differences in intensities 
could be negligible, resulting in the lack of differences in 
estimation errors that was observed in the operant condition 
across uncertainties. Our results thus support the hypoth-
esis that tone binding results from changes in perceptual 
latencies, driven by a predictive pre-activation mechanism 
(Waszak et al. 2012).
These results add to the growing evidence that differ-
ent mechanisms underlie action and tone binding (Waszak 
et al. 2012). For example, whereas establishing a specific 
action–effect association is required for action binding (e.g., 
Moore and Haggard 2008), a more general association is 
sufficient for tone binding to occur (Desantis et al. 2012). In 
addition, experimental interventions can specifically affect 
tone binding without changing action binding. Such inter-
ventions include transcranial magnetic stimulation of the 
pre-supplementary motor area (Moore et al. 2010a) and 
manipulation of subjects’ causal beliefs (Desantis et al. 2011). 
Our results further support this notion: While action–effect 
cue integration is the most plausible explanation for the effect 
of uncertainty on action binding, differences in tone binding 
could be better accounted for by changes in perceptual laten-
cies. Nevertheless, some mechanisms underlying action and 
tone binding may be shared. For example, the learned action–
effect association can contribute to action binding through a 
prediction mechanism (Moore and Haggard 2008). Similarly, 
a prediction mechanism could be implemented for the tone to 
reach the perceptual threshold more rapidly and thereby lead 
to tone binding (Waszak et al. 2012).
Preliminary studies of the functional anatomy of 
binding (Moore et al. 2010a) have motivated the study 
of volitional disorders in patients with neurological and 
psychiatric illnesses, as well as healthy adults (e.g., Moore 
et al. 2010b, 2011). Often, action and tone binding meas-
ures have been added together (i.e., action binding plus the 
negative of tone binding) to generate an ‘overall binding’ 
measure. This measure has been used as a single metric 
of agency for comparing groups or measuring the effects 
of experimental interventions. However, if, as our data 
suggest, action and tone binding have different underlying 
contributory mechanisms, then disease states or interven-
tions may have differential effects on these two forms of 
binding. Not only that our data indicate these two measures 
can be partially independent, but we also show that under 
some circumstances action and tone binding can be inversely 
related: Recall that high sensory uncertainty led to a reduc-
tion in action binding, while tone binding was increased. We 
therefore suggest that future studies should consider action 
and tone binding separately, rather than summing up these 
measures for studying volition.
The current study also has several limitations. First, our 
study draws upon the principles of cue integration, but does 
not apply computational techniques to model the data. For-
mal modeling of individual subject data would require many 
more trials for each condition per subject, which were not 
obtained here. Moreover, statistically optimal cue integra-
tion has been classically described for integrating multiple 
sources of information about one sensory event or object. 
Although action and tone events are synthesized in binding, 
it is possible that some of the principles of cue integration 
may not apply for the binding task, such as the statistical 
optimality. Second, we did not use a continuous variation 
of uncertainty, which would allow us to examine the psy-
chometric properties of sensory uncertainty as a continuous 
effect. Such continuous variation was opted instead for the 
greater power conferred by the ordinal uncertainties. Third, 
our study only varies uncertainty in perception of action 
outcome tone and does not alter uncertainty in perception of 
time of action for fully covering the contribution of action–
effect cue integration to binding. Manipulating temporal 
uncertainty of action would be experimentally more chal-
lenging. One solution could be to study clinical populations, 
such as patients with movement disorders, in which there is 
uncertainty over actions.
In conclusion, our results suggest that cue integration 
between action and effect contributes to the intentional 
binding effect for actions. By contrast, cue integration did 
not account for the observed changes in tone binding. This 
supports the notion that action and tone binding are driven 
by distinct underlying mechanisms. Our data support the 
use of intentional binding in the investigation of the mecha-
nisms of volition, but suggest that action and tone binding 
should be considered separately in future studies.
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